报错内容

SSL_connect:error in SSLv3/TLS write finished
140057291788288:error:1409441B:SSL routines:ssl3_read_bytes:tlsv1 alert decrypt error:ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c:1385:SSL alert number 51

报错原因

gmssl库生成 certificate verify 消息时，对自客户端Hello消息开始到本消息为止（不包括 certificate verify 消息）的所有握手相关信息内容，使用SM3计算摘要，再使用私钥对该摘要签名，但是签名时没有使用SM2_DEFAULT_ID(1234567812345678)在内部做HASH。
- gmssl实现gmtls协议的步骤中缺少使用SM3计算摘要信息，再使用私钥对摘要进行签名
前面你们客户端能连上gmssl服务端，应该是解决了第一个问题。虽然第二个问题没解决，也能连成功，是因为gmssl客户端和服务端计算过程是一样，才没报错，但是这样的计算过程不符合规范的，跟其他对接就会出问题了。
- gmssl无法和其余实现上述功能的平台进行对接

修改文件

目前仅仅修改了 statem_clnt 和 statem_srvr 两个文件，后期手写自己的客户端和服务端代码进行函数调用的时候，还需要修改底层函数的实现细节

statem_clnt

/* ====================================================================* Copyright (c) 2014 - 2017 The GmSSL Project.  All rights reserved.** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions* are met:** 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.** 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in*    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the*    distribution.** 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this*    software must display the following acknowledgment:*    "This product includes software developed by the GmSSL Project.*    (http://gmssl.org/)"** 4. The name "GmSSL Project" must not be used to endorse or promote*    products derived from this software without prior written*    permission. For written permission, please contact*    guanzhi1980@gmail.com.** 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "GmSSL"*    nor may "GmSSL" appear in their names without prior written*    permission of the GmSSL Project.** 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following*    acknowledgment:*    "This product includes software developed by the GmSSL Project*    (http://gmssl.org/)"** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE GmSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE GmSSL PROJECT OR* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.* ====================================================================*/
/** Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.** Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use* this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html*//* ====================================================================* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.** Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.** The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source* license provided above.** ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.**/
/* ====================================================================* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.** The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source* license.** The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.** No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.** No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights* to make use of the Contribution.** THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR* OTHERWISE.*/#include <stdio.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
# include <openssl/md5.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
# include <openssl/sm2.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endifstatic ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p);/** Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?**  Return values are:*  1: Yes*  0: No*/
static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
{/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))return 0;return 1;
}/** Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?**  Return values are:*  1: Yes*  0: No*/
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
{long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))return 1;
#endif/** Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral* ciphersuite or for SRP*/if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK |SSL_kSM2DHE | SSL_kSM2PSK | SSL_kSRP)) {return 1;}return 0;
}/** ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed* handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the* server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.**  Return values are:*  1: Success (transition allowed)*  0: Error (transition not allowed)*/
int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;int ske_expected;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;return 1;}if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;return 1;}}break;case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:if (s->hit) {if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;return 1;}} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;return 1;}} else {if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;return 1;} else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION&& s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL&& s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL&& mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {/** Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session* from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on* the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if* the server is resuming.*/s->hit = 1;st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;return 1;} else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth& (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;return 1;}} else {ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */if (ske_expected|| ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;return 1;}} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST&& cert_req_allowed(s)) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;return 1;} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;return 1;}}}break;case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:/** The CertificateStatus message is optional even if* |tlsext_status_expected| is set*/if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;return 1;}/* Fall through */case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;return 1;}goto err;}/* Fall through */case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;return 1;}goto err;}/* Fall through */case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;return 1;}break;case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;return 1;}} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;return 1;}break;case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;return 1;}break;case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;return 1;}break;default:break;}err:/* No valid transition found */ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);return 0;
}/** client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next* when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_OK:/* Renegotiation - fall through */case TLS_ST_BEFORE:st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:/** No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what* we will be sent*/return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;elsest->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:/** For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is* sent, but no verify packet is sent*//** XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH* cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.*/if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;} else {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;}if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;}return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#elseif (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;elsest->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#endifreturn WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#endifcase TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:if (s->hit) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;} else {return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;}case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:if (s->hit) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;} else {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;}default:/* Shouldn't happen */return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;}
}/** Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from* the client to the server.*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:s->shutdown = 0;if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {ossl_statem_set_error(s);return WORK_ERROR;}}break;case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {if (s->hit) {/** We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these* messages unless we need to.*/st->use_timer = 0;}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPif (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
#endif}return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_OK:return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);default:/* No pre work to be done */break;}return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}/** Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the* client to the server.*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;s->init_num = 0;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)return WORK_MORE_A;if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {/* Treat the next message as the first packet */s->first_packet = 1;}break;case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)return WORK_ERROR;break;case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMPs->session->compress_meth = 0;
#elseif (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)s->session->compress_meth = 0;elses->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endifif (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))return WORK_ERROR;if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))return WORK_ERROR;if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPif (s->hit) {/** Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if* no SCTP used.*/BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,0, NULL);}
#endifdtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);}break;case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPif (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {/** Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if* no SCTP used.*/BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,0, NULL);}
#endifif (statem_flush(s) != 1)return WORK_MORE_B;break;default:/* No post work to be done */break;}return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}/** Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.** Valid return values are:*   1: Success*   0: Error*/
int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:return tls_construct_client_hello(s);case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))return gmtls_construct_client_certificate(s);else
#endifreturn tls_construct_client_certificate(s);case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))return gmtls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);else
#endifreturn tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:return tls_construct_client_verify(s);case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);elsereturn tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
#endifcase TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:return tls_construct_finished(s,s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);default:/* Shouldn't happen */break;}return 0;
}/** Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are* reading. Excludes the message header.*/
unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:return s->max_cert_list;case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:/** Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In* practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured* to provide a long list of acceptable CAs*/return s->max_cert_list;case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)return 3;return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;default:/* Shouldn't happen */break;}return 0;
}/** Process a message that the client has been received from the server.*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
#endifreturn tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))return gmtls_process_server_key_exchange(s, pkt);
#endifreturn tls_process_server_key_exchange(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);default:/* Shouldn't happen */break;}return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}/** Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message* from the server*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPcase TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:/* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;s->rwstate = SSL_READING;BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);return WORK_MORE_A;}ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
#endifdefault:break;}/* Shouldn't happen */return WORK_ERROR;
}int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
{unsigned char *buf;unsigned char *p, *d;int i;int protverr;unsigned long l;int al = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMPint j;SSL_COMP *comp;
#endifSSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);if (protverr != 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);goto err;}if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||/** In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared* "ticket" without a session ID.*/(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||(sess->not_resumable)) {if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))goto err;}/* else use the pre-loaded session */p = s->s3->client_random;/** for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify*/if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {size_t idx;i = 1;for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {if (p[idx]) {i = 0;break;}}} elsei = 1;if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)goto err;/* Do the message type and length last */d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);/*-* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can* choke if we initially report a higher version then* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports* 1.0.** Possible scenario with previous logic:*      1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2*      2. Server hello says TLS 1.0*      3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.*      4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.*      5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.*      6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now*         know that is maximum server supports.*      7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret*         containing version 1.0.** For interoperability it should be OK to always use the* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to* the negotiated version.*/*(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;*(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;/* Random stuff */memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;/* Session ID */if (s->new_session)i = 0;elsei = s->session->session_id_length;*(p++) = i;if (i != 0) {if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);p += i;}/* cookie stuff for DTLS */if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}*(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);p += s->d1->cookie_len;}/* Ciphers supported */i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));if (i == 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);goto err;}
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH/** Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround* chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we* use TLS v1.2*/if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
#endifs2n(i, p);p += i;/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP*(p++) = 1;
#elseif (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)j = 0;elsej = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);*(p++) = 1 + j;for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);*(p++) = comp->id;}
#endif*(p++) = 0;                 /* Add the NULL method *//* TLS extensions */if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);goto err;}if ((s->version != GMTLS_VERSION) && (p =ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,&al)) == NULL) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}l = p - d;if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}return 1;err:ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{int al;unsigned int cookie_len;PACKET cookiepkt;if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);goto f_err;}if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;f_err:ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;const SSL_CIPHER *c;PACKET session_id;size_t session_id_len;const unsigned char *cipherchars;int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;unsigned int compression;unsigned int sversion;int protverr;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMPSSL_COMP *comp;
#endifif (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);if (protverr != 0) {al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);goto f_err;}/* load the server hello data *//* load the server random */if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}s->hit = 0;/* Get the session-id. */if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id|| session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);goto f_err;}if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;goto f_err;}/** Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.* EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.* Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.* Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)* works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application* layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST* servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone* is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if* we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the* server wants to resume.*/if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&s->session->tlsext_tick) {const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,&s->session->master_key_length,NULL, &pref_cipher,s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);} else {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}}if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length&& memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,session_id_len) == 0) {if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {/* actually a client application bug */al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);goto f_err;}s->hit = 1;} else {/** If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server* didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.* In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.*/if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {goto f_err;}}s->session->ssl_version = s->version;s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;/* session_id_len could be 0 */if (session_id_len > 0)memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),session_id_len);}/* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);if (c == NULL) {/* unknown cipher */al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);goto f_err;}/** Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed* version.*/s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;/** If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,* or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.*/if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);goto f_err;}sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);if (i < 0) {/* we did not say we would use this cipher */al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);goto f_err;}/** Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is* set and use it for comparison.*/if (s->session->cipher)s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);goto f_err;}s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;/* lets get the compression algorithm *//* COMPRESSION */if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;goto f_err;}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMPif (compression != 0) {al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);goto f_err;}/** If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session* using compression.*/if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);goto f_err;}
#elseif (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);goto f_err;}if (compression == 0)comp = NULL;else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);goto f_err;} else {comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);}if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);goto f_err;} else {s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;}
#endif/* TLS extensions */if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);goto err;}if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {/* wrong packet length */al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);goto f_err;}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPif (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];/** Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if* no SCTP used.*/memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,sizeof(sctpauthkey),labelbuffer,sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)goto err;BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);}
#endifreturn MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;f_err:ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);err:ossl_statem_set_error(s);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;X509 *x = NULL;const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}certstart = certbytes;x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);if (x == NULL) {al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);goto f_err;}if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}x = NULL;}i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);/** The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order* for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.* However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set* to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes* no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was* reverted because at least one application *only* set* SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused* server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did* nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags* sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the* (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is* set. The *documented* interface remains the same.*/if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);goto f_err;}ERR_clear_error();          /* but we keep s->verify_result */if (i > 1) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;goto f_err;}s->session->peer_chain = sk;/** Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,* which we don't include in statem_srvr.c*/x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);sk = NULL;/** VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {x = NULL;al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);goto f_err;}i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);if (i < 0) {x = NULL;al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);goto f_err;}exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx&& (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||(i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256&& i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {x = NULL;al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);goto f_err;}s->session->peer_type = i;X509_free(s->session->peer);X509_up_ref(x);s->session->peer = x;s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;x = NULL;ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;goto done;f_err:ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);err:ossl_statem_set_error(s);done:X509_free(x);sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);return ret;
}static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSKPACKET psk_identity_hint;/* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);return 0;}/** Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in* tls_construct_client_key_exchange.  Assume that the maximum length of* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK* identity.*/if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);return 0;}if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;} else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,&s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;}return 1;
#elseSSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRPPACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);return 0;}if ((s->srp_ctx.N =BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL|| (s->srp_ctx.g =BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL|| (s->srp_ctx.s =BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL|| (s->srp_ctx.B =BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);return 0;}if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);return 0;}/* We must check if there is a certificate */if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);return 1;
#elseSSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DHPACKET prime, generator, pub_key;EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;DH *dh = NULL;BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;int check_bits = 0;if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);return 0;}peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();dh = DH_new();if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL);bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key),NULL);if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);goto err;}/* test non-zero pupkey */if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);goto err;}if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);goto err;}p = g = NULL;if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);goto err;}if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);goto err;}bnpub_key = NULL;if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);goto err;}if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;/** FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with* public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this*/if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */return 1;err:BN_free(p);BN_free(g);BN_free(bnpub_key);DH_free(dh);EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);return 0;
#elseSSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECPACKET encoded_pt;const unsigned char *ecparams;int curve_nid;unsigned int curve_flags;EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;/** Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH* public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.*/if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);return 0;}/** Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an* invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.*/if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);return 0;}curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);if (curve_nid == 0) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);return 0;}if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);EVP_PKEY_free(key);return 0;}s->s3->peer_tmp = key;} else {/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);if (pctx == NULL|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);return 0;}EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);pctx = NULL;}if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);return 0;}/* parse remote ephem point */if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);return 0;}/** The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA* and ECDSA.*/if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2)*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
#endifelse if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */return 1;
#elseSSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;
#endif
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{int al = -1;long alg_k;EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;PACKET save_param_start, signature;alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;save_param_start = *pkt;#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
#endifif (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))goto err;}/* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))goto err;} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))goto err;} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2DHE | SSL_kSM2PSK)) {if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))goto err;} else if (alg_k) {al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);goto err;}/* if it was signed, check the signature */if (pkey != NULL) {PACKET params;int maxsig;const EVP_MD *md = NULL;EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;/** |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference* equals the length of the parameters.*/if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {const unsigned char *sigalgs;int rv;if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);goto err;}rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);if (rv == -1) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto err;} else if (rv == 0) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;goto err;}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUGfprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA} else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA)md = EVP_md5_sha1();
# elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SM3)md = EVP_sm3();
# elseshould_not_happen!!			
# endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS} else if (s->method->version == GMTLS_VERSION&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_SM3) {md = EVP_sm3();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA} else {md = EVP_sha1();
#endif}if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto err;}maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);if (maxsig < 0) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}/** Check signature length*/if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {/* wrong packet length */al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);goto err;}md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();if (md_ctx == NULL) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0) {EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2) {unsigned char z[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];size_t zlen = sizeof(z);char *id = SM2_DEFAULT_ID;if (!SM2_compute_id_digest(md, id, strlen(id), z, &zlen,EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_SM2_LIB);goto err;}if (EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, z, zlen) <= 0) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}}
#endifif (EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0|| EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0|| EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&params),PACKET_remaining(&params)) <= 0) {EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {/* bad signature */EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);goto err;}EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);} else {/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))&& !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {/* Might be wrong key type, check it */if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);} else {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;}goto err;}/* still data left over */if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);goto err;}}return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;err:if (al != -1)ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;X509_NAME *xn = NULL;const unsigned char *data;const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}/* get the certificate types */if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto err;}OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);s->cert->ctypes = NULL;if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {/* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;}for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto err;}/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;}if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);goto err;}if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}} else {ssl_set_default_md(s);}/* get the CA RDNs */if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto err;}while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto err;}namestart = namebytes;if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,name_len)) == NULL) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);goto err;}if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto err;}if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}xn = NULL;}/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;ca_sk = NULL;ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;goto done;err:ossl_statem_set_error(s);done:X509_NAME_free(xn);sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);return ret;
}static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
{return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{int al;unsigned int ticklen;unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}/* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */if (ticklen == 0)return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;SSL_SESSION *new_sess;/** We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new* one*/if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {/** Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails*/SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);}if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto f_err;}SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);s->session = new_sess;}OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;/** There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set* an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in* ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work* and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The* other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is* presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.* We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions* elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is* SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.*/if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_sha256), NULL)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;f_err:ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);err:ossl_statem_set_error(s);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{int al;unsigned long resplen;unsigned int type;if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)|| type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);goto f_err;}if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto f_err;}if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;f_err:ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {/* should contain no data */ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRPif (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;}}
#endif/** at this point we check that we have the required stuff from* the server*/if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;}/** Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and* |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status* message, or NULL and -1 otherwise*/if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {int ret;ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);if (ret == 0) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;}if (ret < 0) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;}}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CTif (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {/* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;}}
#endif#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP/* Only applies to renegotiation */if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))&& s->renegotiate != 0)return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;else
#endifreturn MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,size_t *pskhdrlen, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSKint ret = 0;/** The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a* \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating* strnlen.*/char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];size_t identitylen = 0;unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;char *tmpidentity = NULL;size_t psklen = 0;if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto err;}memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,psk, sizeof(psk));if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;goto err;} else if (psklen == 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;goto err;}identitylen = strlen(identity);if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;goto err;}tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto err;}OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;tmppsk = NULL;OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;tmpidentity = NULL;s2n(identitylen, *p);memcpy(*p, identity, identitylen);*pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;*p += identitylen;ret = 1;err:OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);return ret;
#elseSSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSAunsigned char *q;EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;size_t enclen;unsigned char *pms = NULL;size_t pmslen = 0;if (s->session->peer == NULL) {/** We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.*/SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;}pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;}pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);if (pms == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;}pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) {goto err;}q = *p;/* Fix buf for TLS, GMTLS and beyond */if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION || SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))*p += 2;pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, *p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);goto err;}*len = enclen;EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);pctx = NULL;
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECKif (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)(*p)[1]++;if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
# endif/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION || SSL_IS_GMTLS(s)) {s2n(*len, q);*len += 2;}s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;return 1;err:OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);return 0;
#elseSSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DHDH *dh_clnt = NULL;const BIGNUM *pub_key;EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;if (skey == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;}ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);if (ckey == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;}dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);return 0;}/* send off the data */DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);*len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);s2n(*len, *p);BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p);*len += 2;EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);return 1;
#elseSSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECunsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;int encoded_pt_len = 0;EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;if (skey == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;}ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);if (ckey == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}/* Generate encoding of client key */encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);goto err;}EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);ckey = NULL;*len = encoded_pt_len;/* length of encoded point */**p = *len;*p += 1;/* copy the point */memcpy(*p, encodedPoint, *len);/* increment len to account for length field */*len += 1;OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);return 1;err:EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);return 0;
#elseSSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST/* GOST key exchange message creation */EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;X509 *peer_cert;size_t msglen;unsigned int md_len;unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;unsigned char *pms = NULL;size_t pmslen = 0;if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;/** Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it*/peer_cert = s->session->peer;if (!peer_cert) {*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);return 0;}pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);return 0;}/** If we have send a certificate, and certificate key* parameters match those of server certificate, use* certificate key for key exchange*//* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */pmslen = 32;pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);if (pms == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0/* Generate session key */|| RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;};/** Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context* data*/ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();if (ukm_hash == NULL|| EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);ukm_hash = NULL;if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);goto err;}/* Make GOST keytransport blob message *//** Encapsulate it into sequence*/*((*p)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;msglen = 255;if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);goto err;}if (msglen >= 0x80) {*((*p)++) = 0x81;*((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;*len = msglen + 3;} else {*((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;*len = msglen + 2;}memcpy(*p, tmp, msglen);EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;return 1;err:EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);return 0;
#elseSSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRPif (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {/* send off the data */*len = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);s2n(*len, *p);BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, *p);*len += 2;} else {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;}OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);return 0;}return 1;
#elseSSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return 0;
#endif
}int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{unsigned char *p;int len;size_t pskhdrlen = 0;unsigned long alg_k;int al = -1;alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;p = ssl_handshake_start(s);if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)&& !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &p, &pskhdrlen, &al))goto err;if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {len = 0;} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, &p, &len, &al))goto err;} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, &p, &len, &al))goto err;} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2DHE |SSL_kSM2PSK)) {if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, &p, &len, &al))goto err;} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, &p, &len, &al))goto err;} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, &p, &len, &al))goto err;} else {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}len += pskhdrlen;if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, len)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}return 1;err:if (al != -1)ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSKOPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
#endifossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;
}int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
{unsigned char *pms = NULL;size_t pmslen = 0;pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP/* Check for SRP */if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}return 1;}
#endifif (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);/* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */pms = NULL;pmslen = 0;goto err;}pms = NULL;pmslen = 0;#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPif (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];/** Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP* used.*/memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)goto err;BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);}
#endifreturn 1;err:OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;return 0;
}int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
{unsigned char *p;EVP_PKEY *pkey;const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;unsigned u = 0;unsigned long n = 0;long hdatalen = 0;void *hdata;int ret;unsigned char out[81920];mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();if (mctx == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
// modify begin 使用gmtls 生成 certificate verify 消息，应该使用签名证书私钥 
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s) && s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_SM2].privatekey)pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_SM2].privatekey;else
#endifpkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
// modify endhdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);if (hdatalen <= 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}memcpy(out, (unsigned char *)hdata, hdatalen);out[hdatalen] = 0;ret = hdatalen;// modify begin 使用gmtls 对从 client hello 消息到 client CertificateVerify 消息（不包括client CertificateVerify消息）所有内容做SM3摘要计算
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2EVP_MD_CTX *mctx1 = NULL;if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2) {// from client hello to client CertificateVerify(not include CertificateVerify) make sm3mctx1 = EVP_MD_CTX_new();if (mctx1 == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}EVP_MD_CTX_init(mctx1);if (!EVP_DigestInit(mctx1, md)|| EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx1, (unsigned char *)hdata,hdatalen) <= 0|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx1, out, &ret) <= 0){SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}out[ret] = 0;}if (mctx1 != NULL)EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx1);
#endif
// modify endif (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}p += 2;n = 2;}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUGfprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif// modify begin 使用gmtls 从上面得到的SM3摘要结果，还需要使用 SM2_DEFAULT_ID（1234567812345678） 做内部哈希，再签名if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)){SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2){// SM2_DEFAULT_ID to assign, when compute CertificateVerify signunsigned char z[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];size_t zlen;char *id = NULL;id = SM2_DEFAULT_ID;zlen = sizeof(z);if (!SM2_compute_id_digest(EVP_sm3(), id, strlen(id), z, &zlen,EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_SM2_LIB);goto err;}if (!EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, z, zlen)){SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}}
#endif//if (!EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,s->session->master_key_length,s->session->master_key)) || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey))if (!EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, out, ret) || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,s->session->master_key_length,s->session->master_key)) || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)){SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}
// modify end#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST{int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);}
#endifs2n(u, p);n += u + 2;/* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))goto err;if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);return 1;err:EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);return 0;
}/** Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check* cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client* certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)return 0;/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])return 0;/** If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also* adjusts suite B digest if necessary.*/if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))return 0;return 1;
}WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{X509 *x509 = NULL;EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;int i;if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {/* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */if (s->cert->cert_cb) {i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);if (i < 0) {s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;return WORK_MORE_A;}if (i == 0) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;}if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;/* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */wst = WORK_MORE_B;}/* We need to get a client cert */if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {/** If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;* return(-1); We then get retied later*/i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);if (i < 0) {s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;return WORK_MORE_B;}s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))i = 0;} else if (i == 1) {i = 0;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);}X509_free(x509);EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))i = 0;if (i == 0) {if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;} else {s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}}}return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;}/* Shouldn't ever get here */return WORK_ERROR;
}int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,(s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}return 1;
}#define has_bits(i,m)   (((i)&(m)) == (m))int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{int i;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECint idx;
#endiflong alg_k, alg_a;EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;/* we don't have a certificate */if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))return (1);/* This is the passed certificate */#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECidx = s->session->peer_type;if ((idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) || (idx == SSL_PKEY_SM2)) { /* GMTLS */if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {/* check failed */SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);goto f_err;} else {return 1;}} else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) || (alg_a & SSL_aSM2)) { /* GMTLS */SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);goto f_err;}
#endifpkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);goto f_err;}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSAelse if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);goto f_err;}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSAif (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);goto f_err;}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DHif ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto f_err;}
#endifreturn (1);f_err:ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);return (0);
}#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
{unsigned int len, padding_len;unsigned char *d;len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;d[4] = len;memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);d[5 + len] = padding_len;memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);*(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;s->init_off = 0;return 1;
}
#endifint ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{int i = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINEif (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);if (i != 0)return i;}
#endifif (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);return i;
}int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p)
{int i, j = 0;const SSL_CIPHER *c;unsigned char *q;int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;/* Set disabled masks for this session */ssl_set_client_disabled(s);if (sk == NULL)return (0);q = p;for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);/* Skip disabled ciphers */if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))continue;j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);p += j;}/** If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add* applicable SCSVs.*/if (p != q) {if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);p += j;}if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);p += j;}}return (p - q);
}

statem_srvr

/* ====================================================================* Copyright (c) 2014 - 2017 The GmSSL Project.  All rights reserved.** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions* are met:** 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.** 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in*    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the*    distribution.** 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this*    software must display the following acknowledgment:*    "This product includes software developed by the GmSSL Project.*    (http://gmssl.org/)"** 4. The name "GmSSL Project" must not be used to endorse or promote*    products derived from this software without prior written*    permission. For written permission, please contact*    guanzhi1980@gmail.com.** 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "GmSSL"*    nor may "GmSSL" appear in their names without prior written*    permission of the GmSSL Project.** 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following*    acknowledgment:*    "This product includes software developed by the GmSSL Project*    (http://gmssl.org/)"** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE GmSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE GmSSL PROJECT OR* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.* ====================================================================*/
/** Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.** Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use* this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html*//* ====================================================================* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.** Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.** The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source* license provided above.** ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.**/
/* ====================================================================* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.** The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source* license.** The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.** No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.** No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights* to make use of the Contribution.** THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR* OTHERWISE.*/#include <stdio.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
# include <openssl/sm2.h>
#endifstatic STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,PACKET *cipher_suites,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)**skp, int sslv2format,int *al);/** server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake* state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The* message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state* is in |s->statem.hand_state|.**  Valid return values are:*  1: Success (transition allowed)*  0: Error (transition not allowed)*/
int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_BEFORE:case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;return 1;}break;case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:/** If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either* 1) We didn't request a Certificate* OR* 2) If we did request one then*      a) We allow no Certificate to be returned*      AND*      b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0*         list if we requested a certificate)*/if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)&& (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {/** This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just* not going to accept it because we require a client* cert.*/ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);return 0;}st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;return 1;}} else {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;return 1;}} else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;return 1;}}break;case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;return 1;}break;case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:/** We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have* received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|* will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is* not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in* the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be* set.*/if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {/** For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH* pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is* not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses* its key from the certificate for key exchange.*/st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;return 1;}} else {if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;return 1;}}break;case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;return 1;}break;case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEGif (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;return 1;}} else {
#endifif (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;return 1;}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG}
#endifbreak;#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEGcase TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;return 1;}break;
#endifcase TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;return 1;}break;default:break;}/* No valid transition found */ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);return 0;
}/** Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?** Valid return values are:*   1: Yes*   0: No*/
static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))return 1;
#endif/** only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a* sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For* ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if* the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,* the server certificate contains the server's public key for* key exchange.*/if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kSM2DHE)/** PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if* provided*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK/* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */|| ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))&& s->cert->psk_identity_hint)/* For other PSK always send SKE */|| (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2PSK)))
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif) {return 1;}return 0;
}/** Should we send a CertificateRequest message?** Valid return values are:*   1: Yes*   0: No*/
static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER/** if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert* during re-negotiation:*/&& (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))/** never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in* RFC 2246):*/&& (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)/** ... except when the application insists on* verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts* this for SSL 3)*/|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)/** With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests* are omitted*/&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {return 1;}return 0;
}/** server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next* when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_BEFORE:/* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;case TLS_ST_OK:/* We must be trying to renegotiate */st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;elsest->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:if (s->hit) {if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;elsest->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;} else {/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, *//* normal PSK or SRP */if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &(SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;} else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;} else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;} else {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;}}return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;}/* Fall through */case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;}/* Fall through */case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:if (send_certificate_request(s)) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;}/* Fall through */case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:if (s->hit) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;} else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;} else {st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;}return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:if (s->hit) {return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;}st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;default:/* Shouldn't happen */return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;}
}/** Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from* the server to the client.*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:s->shutdown = 0;if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);break;case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:s->shutdown = 0;if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);/* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */st->use_timer = 0;}break;case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {/** Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now*/st->use_timer = 1;}break;case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPif (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
#endifreturn WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {/** We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer*/st->use_timer = 0;}break;case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {ossl_statem_set_error(s);return WORK_ERROR;}if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {/** We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have* already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,* but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.*/st->use_timer = 0;}return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;case TLS_ST_OK:return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);default:/* No pre work to be done */break;}return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}/** Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the* server to the client.*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;s->init_num = 0;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:if (statem_flush(s) != 1)return WORK_MORE_A;if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {ossl_statem_set_error(s);return WORK_ERROR;}break;case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:if (statem_flush(s) != 1)return WORK_MORE_A;/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {ossl_statem_set_error(s);return WORK_ERROR;}/** The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to* treat like it was the first packet*/s->first_packet = 1;break;case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPif (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];/** Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no* SCTP used.*/memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,0) <= 0) {ossl_statem_set_error(s);return WORK_ERROR;}BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);}
#endifbreak;case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPif (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {/** Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if* no SCTP used.*/BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,0, NULL);}
#endifif (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)){ossl_statem_set_error(s);return WORK_ERROR;}if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);break;case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:if (statem_flush(s) != 1)return WORK_MORE_A;break;case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:if (statem_flush(s) != 1)return WORK_MORE_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPif (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {/** Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if* no SCTP used.*/BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,0, NULL);}
#endifbreak;default:/* No post work to be done */break;}return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}/** Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.** Valid return values are:*   1: Success*   0: Error*/
int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:return tls_construct_hello_request(s);case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:return tls_construct_server_hello(s);case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))return gmtls_construct_server_certificate(s);
#endifreturn tls_construct_server_certificate(s);case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))return gmtls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
#endifreturn tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:return tls_construct_server_done(s);case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:return tls_construct_cert_status(s);case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);elsereturn tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:return tls_construct_finished(s,s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);default:/* Shouldn't happen */break;}return 0;
}/** Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,* calculated as follows:**  2 + # client_version*  32 + # only valid length for random*  1 + # length of session_id*  32 + # maximum size for session_id*  2 + # length of cipher suites*  2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array*  1 + # length of compression_methods*  2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods*  2 + # length of extensions*  2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions*/
#define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH         131396#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH      2048
#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH           514/** Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are* reading. Excludes the message header.*/
unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:return s->max_cert_list;case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEGcase TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
#endifcase TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;default:/* Shouldn't happen */break;}return 0;
}/** Process a message that the server has received from the client.*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
#endifreturn tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))return gmtls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
#endifreturn tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEGcase TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
#endifcase TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);default:/* Shouldn't happen */break;}return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}/** Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message* from the client*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;switch (st->hand_state) {case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPif (                    /* Is this SCTP? */BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))/* Are we renegotiating? */&& s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;s->rwstate = SSL_READING;BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);return WORK_MORE_A;} else {ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);}
#endifreturn WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;default:break;}/* Shouldn't happen */return WORK_ERROR;
}#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
{int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&(s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {/** RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp* login name*/ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;} else {ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);}}return ret;
}
#endifint tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
{if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}return 1;
}unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,unsigned char *cookie,unsigned char cookie_len)
{unsigned int msg_len;unsigned char *p;p = buf;/* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;*(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);p += cookie_len;msg_len = p - buf;return msg_len;
}int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
{unsigned int len;unsigned char *buf;buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,&(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len);len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;/* number of bytes to write */s->init_num = len;s->init_off = 0;return 1;
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;unsigned int j, complen = 0;unsigned long id;const SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMPSSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endifSTACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;int protverr;/* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;int is_v2_record;static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);PACKET_null_init(&cookie);/* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */if (is_v2_record) {unsigned int version;unsigned int mt;/*-* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS* record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes* the rest right through. Its format is:* Byte  Content* 0-1   msg_length - decoded by the record layer* 2     msg_type - s->init_msg points here* 3-4   version* 5-6   cipher_spec_length* 7-8   session_id_length* 9-10  challenge_length* ...   ...*/if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)|| mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {/** Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record* layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record* in the first place*/SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {/* No protocol version supplied! */SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);goto err;}if (version == 0x0002) {/* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);goto err;} else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {/* SSLv3/TLS */s->client_version = version;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS} else if (version == GMTLS_VERSION) {s->client_version = version;
#endif} else {/* No idea what protocol this is */SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);goto err;}} else {/** use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may* differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)*/if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);goto f_err;}}/** Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check* versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.*/if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);} else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;} else {protverr = 0;}if (protverr) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {/** similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version* number*/s->version = s->client_version;}al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;goto f_err;}/* Parse the message and load client random. */if (is_v2_record) {/** Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello* Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.* Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.*/unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;PACKET challenge;if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;goto f_err;}if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)/* No extensions. */|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;goto f_err;}/* Load the client random and compression list. */challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :challenge_len;memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -challenge_len, challenge_len)/* Advertise only null compression. */|| !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}PACKET_null_init(&extensions);} else {/* Regular ClientHello. */if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}/** If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,* just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.* So check cookie length...*/if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)return 1;}}if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}/* Could be empty. */extensions = *pkt;}if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {/* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==0) {al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);goto f_err;/* else cookie verification succeeded */}/* default verification */} else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;}if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);if (protverr != 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);s->version = s->client_version;al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;goto f_err;}}}s->hit = 0;/** We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.* TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.** Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally* ignore resumption requests with flag* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on* this for security won't even compile against older library versions).* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be* ignored.*/if (is_v2_record ||(s->new_session &&(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))goto err;} else {i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);/** Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated* version.* RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption* with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but* the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.* In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and* will abort the handshake with an error.*/if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {/* previous session */s->hit = 1;} else if (i == -1) {goto err;} else {/* i == 0 */if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))goto err;}}if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {goto f_err;}/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */if (s->hit) {j = 0;id = s->session->cipher->id;#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUGfprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endiffor (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUGfprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endifif (c->id == id) {j = 1;break;}}if (j == 0) {/** we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked* to reuse it*/al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);goto f_err;}}complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)break;}if (j >= complen) {/* no compress */al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);goto f_err;}/* TLS extensions */if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);goto err;}}/** Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket* processing to use it in key derivation.*/{unsigned char *pos;pos = s->s3->server_random;if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {goto f_err;}}#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLSif (!s->hit && (s->version == GMTLS_VERSION || s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)&& s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
#elseif (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
#endifconst SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,&s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,&pref_cipher,s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {s->hit = 1;s->session->ciphers = ciphers;s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;ciphers = NULL;/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */pref_cipher =pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,SSL_get_ciphers(s));if (pref_cipher == NULL) {al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);goto f_err;}s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);}}/** Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other* options, we will now look for them.  We have complen-1 compression* algorithms from the client, starting at q.*/s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;unsigned int k;/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm *//* Can't disable compression */if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);goto f_err;}/* Look for resumed compression method */for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);if (comp_id == comp->id) {s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;break;}}if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);goto f_err;}/* Look for resumed method in compression list */for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)break;}if (k >= complen) {al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);goto f_err;}} else if (s->hit)comp = NULL;else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {/* See if we have a match */int m, nn, v, done = 0;unsigned int o;nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);v = comp->id;for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {done = 1;break;}}if (done)break;}if (done)s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;elsecomp = NULL;}
#else/** If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session* using compression.*/if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);goto f_err;}
#endif/** Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher*/if (!s->hit) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMPs->session->compress_meth = 0;
#elses->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endifsk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);s->session->ciphers = ciphers;if (ciphers == NULL) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto f_err;}ciphers = NULL;if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);goto err;}}sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;f_err:ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);err:ossl_statem_set_error(s);sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;}WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {if (!s->hit) {/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */if (s->cert->cert_cb) {int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);if (rv == 0) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);goto f_err;}if (rv < 0) {s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;return WORK_MORE_A;}s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;}cipher =ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));if (cipher == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);goto f_err;}s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;/* check whether we should disable session resumption */if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kSM2DHE)) != 0));if (s->session->not_resumable)/* do not send a session ticket */s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;} else {/* Session-id reuse */s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;}if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}}/*-* we now have the following setup.* client_random* cipher_list          - our preferred list of ciphers* ciphers              - the clients preferred list of ciphers* compression          - basically ignored right now* ssl version is set   - sslv3* s->session           - The ssl session has been setup.* s->hit               - session reuse flag* s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.*//* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);goto f_err;}}wst = WORK_MORE_B;}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRPif (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {int ret;if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {/** callback indicates further work to be done*/s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;return WORK_MORE_B;}if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {/** This is not really an error but the only means to for* a client to detect whether srp is supported.*/if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);elseSSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);goto f_err;}}
#endifs->renegotiate = 2;return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;f_err:ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return WORK_ERROR;
}int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
{unsigned char *buf;unsigned char *p, *d;int i, sl;int al = 0;unsigned long l;buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;/* Do the message type and length last */d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);*(p++) = s->version >> 8;*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;/** Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in* tls_process_client_hello()*/memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;/*-* There are several cases for the session ID to send* back in the server hello:* - For session reuse from the session cache,*   we send back the old session ID.* - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)*   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"*   (which doesn't actually identify the session).* - If it is a new session, we send back the new*   session ID.* - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,*   we send back a 0-length session ID.* s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed* to send back.*/if (s->session->not_resumable ||(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)&& !s->hit))s->session->session_id_length = 0;sl = s->session->session_id_length;if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}*(p++) = sl;memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);p += sl;/* put the cipher */i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);p += i;/* put the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP*(p++) = 0;
#elseif (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)*(p++) = 0;else*(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endifif (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}if ((s->version != GMTLS_VERSION) && (p =ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,&al)) == NULL) {ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}/* do the header */l = (p - d);if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}return 1;
}int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
{if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {ossl_statem_set_error(s);}}return 1;
}int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DHEVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;int j;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECunsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;int encodedlen = 0;int curve_id = 0;
#endifEVP_PKEY *pkey;const EVP_MD *md = NULL;unsigned char *p, *d;int al, i;unsigned long type;int n;const BIGNUM *r[4];int nr[4], kn;BUF_MEM *buf;EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;if (!(md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new())) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;buf = s->init_buf;r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;n = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSKif (type & SSL_PSK) {/** reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/n += 2;if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);}/* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {} else
#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DHif (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {CERT *cert = s->cert;EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;DH *dh;if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {DH_free(dhp);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto f_err;}EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);pkdhp = pkdh;} else {pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;}if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);if (pkdh == NULL) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto f_err;}pkdhp = pkdh;}if (pkdhp == NULL) {al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);goto f_err;}if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);goto f_err;}if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);pkdh = NULL;DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECif (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2DHE | SSL_kSM2PSK)) {int nid;if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);if (curve_id == 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);goto err;}s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);/* Generate a new key for this curve */if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto f_err;}/* Encode the public key. */encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,&encodedPoint);if (encodedlen == 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);goto err;}/** We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key* exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to* encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.*/n += 4 + encodedlen;/** We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we* can set these to NULLs*/r[0] = NULL;r[1] = NULL;r[2] = NULL;r[3] = NULL;} else
#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRPif (type & SSL_kSRP) {if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);goto err;}r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;} else
#endif{al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);goto f_err;}for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRPif ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))n += 1 + nr[i];else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH/*-* for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS* stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length* as the prime, so use the length of the prime here*/if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)))n += 2 + nr[0];else
#endifn += 2 + nr[i];}if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))== NULL) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;goto f_err;}kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);/* Allow space for signature algorithm */if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))kn += 2;/* Allow space for signature length */kn += 2;} else {pkey = NULL;kn = 0;}if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);goto err;}d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSKif (type & SSL_PSK) {/* copy PSK identity hint */if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {/** Should not happen - we already checked this when we set* the identity hint*/SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}s2n(len, p);memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len);p += len;} else {s2n(0, p);}}
#endiffor (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRPif ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {*p = nr[i];p++;} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH/*-* for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS* stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length* as the prime*/if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {s2n(nr[0], p);for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) {*p = 0;++p;}} else
#endifs2n(nr[i], p);BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);p += nr[i];}#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECif (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2DHE | SSL_kSM2PSK)) {/** XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In* this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte* CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded* point], followed by the actual encoded point itself*/*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;p += 1;*p = 0;p += 1;*p = curve_id;p += 1;*p = encodedlen;p += 1;memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);encodedPoint = NULL;p += encodedlen;}
#endif/* not anonymous */if (pkey != NULL) {/** n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p* points to the space at the end.*/if (md) {/* send signature algorithm */if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {/* Should never happen */al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto f_err;}p += 2;}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUGfprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endifif (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2) {unsigned char z[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];size_t zlen = sizeof(z);char *id = SM2_DEFAULT_ID;if (!SM2_compute_id_digest(md, id, strlen(id), z, &zlen,EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_SM2);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}if (EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, z, zlen) <= 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_SM2);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}}
#endifif (EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0|| EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0|| EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0|| EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),(unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}s2n(i, p);n += i + 2;if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {n += 2;}} else {/* Is this error check actually needed? */al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);goto f_err;}}if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto f_err;}EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);return 1;f_err:ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DHEVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECOPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
#endifEVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;
}int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{unsigned char *p, *d;int i, j, nl, off, n;STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;X509_NAME *name;BUF_MEM *buf;buf = s->init_buf;d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);/* get the list of acceptable cert types */p++;n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);d[0] = n;p += n;n++;if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {const unsigned char *psigs;unsigned char *etmp = p;nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);/* Skip over length for now */p += 2;nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);/* Now fill in length */s2n(nl, etmp);p += nl;n += nl + 2;}off = n;p += 2;n += 2;sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);nl = 0;if (sk != NULL) {for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);goto err;}p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;s2n(j, p);i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);n += 2 + j;nl += 2 + j;}}/* else no CA names */p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;s2n(nl, p);if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;return 1;err:ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;
}static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSKunsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];size_t psklen;PACKET psk_identity;if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);return 0;}if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);return 0;}if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);return 0;}if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;}psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,psk, sizeof(psk));if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;} else if (psklen == 0) {/** PSK related to the given identity not found*/*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);return 0;}OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);return 0;}s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;return 1;
#else/* Should never happen */*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSAunsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];int decrypt_len;unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;size_t j, padding_len;PACKET enc_premaster;RSA *rsa = NULL;unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;int ret = 0;rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);if (rsa == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);return 0;}/* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {enc_premaster = *pkt;} else {if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);return 0;}}/** We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to* iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret* (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because* their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.*/if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);return 0;}rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);return 0;}/** We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,* section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and* generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt* fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1*/if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)goto err;/** Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of* the timing-sensitive code below.*/decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);if (decrypt_len < 0)goto err;/* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. *//** The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys* are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures* PS is at least 8 bytes.*/if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {*al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);goto err;}padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);}decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);/** If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then* version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The* Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number* check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in* constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.*/version_good =constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],(unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));version_good &=constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],(unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));/** The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).* However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol* version instead if the server does not support the requested* protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such* clients.*/if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {unsigned char workaround_good;workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],(unsigned)(s->version >> 8));workaround_good &=constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],(unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));version_good |= workaround_good;}/** Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to* remain non-zero (0xff).*/decrypt_good &= version_good;/** Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using* decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not* contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees* it is still sufficiently large to read from.*/for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],rand_premaster_secret[j]);}if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}ret = 1;err:OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);return ret;
#else/* Should never happen */*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DHEVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;DH *cdh;unsigned int i;BIGNUM *pub_key;const unsigned char *data;EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;int ret = 0;if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);goto err;}skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;if (skey == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);goto err;}if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);goto err;}if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {/* We already checked we have enough data */*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);goto err;}cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);if (pub_key != NULL)BN_free(pub_key);goto err;}if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}ret = 1;EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;err:EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);return ret;
#else/* Should never happen */*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECEVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;int ret = 0;if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {/* We don't support ECDH client auth */*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);goto err;} else {unsigned int i;const unsigned char *data;/** Get client's public key from encoded point in the* ClientKeyExchange message.*//* Get encoded point length */if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto err;}ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto err;}if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);goto err;}}if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}ret = 1;EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;err:EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);return ret;
#else/* Should never happen */*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRPunsigned int i;const unsigned char *data;if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);return 0;}if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);return 0;}if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);return 0;}OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);return 0;}if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;}return 1;
#else/* Should never happen */*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;
#endif
}static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOSTEVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;unsigned char premaster_secret[32];const unsigned char *start;size_t outlen = 32, inlen;unsigned long alg_a;int Ttag, Tclass;long Tlen;long sess_key_len;const unsigned char *data;int ret = 0;/* Get our certificate private key */alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {/** New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too*/pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;if (pk == NULL) {pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;}if (pk == NULL) {pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;}} else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;}pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);return 0;}if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;}/** If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe* use it for key exchange.  Don't mind errors from* EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a* client certificate for authorization only.*/client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);if (client_pub_pkey) {if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)ERR_clear_error();}/* Decrypt session key */sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,&Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED|| Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);goto err;}start = data;inlen = Tlen;if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);goto err;}/* Generate master secret */if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;ret = 1;err:EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);return ret;
#else/* Should never happen */*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);return 0;
#endif
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{int al = -1;unsigned long alg_k;alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;/* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))goto err;if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {/* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto err;}/* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))goto err;} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))goto err;} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2DHE | SSL_kSM2PSK)) {if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))goto err;} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))goto err;} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))goto err;} else {al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);goto err;}return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;err:if (al != -1)ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSKOPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
#endifossl_statem_set_error(s);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTPif (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];/** Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP* used.*/memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,0) <= 0) {ossl_statem_set_error(s);return WORK_ERROR;;}BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);}wst = WORK_MORE_B;}if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)/* Is this SCTP? */&& BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))/* Are we renegotiating? */&& s->renegotiate/* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */&& (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)&& BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;s->rwstate = SSL_READING;BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);return WORK_MORE_B;} else {ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);}
#endifif (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {/** No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need* the handshake_buffer*/if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {ossl_statem_set_error(s);return WORK_ERROR;}return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;} else {if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return WORK_ERROR;}/** For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support* extms we've done this already so this is a no-op*/if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {ossl_statem_set_error(s);return WORK_ERROR;}}return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;const unsigned char *sig, *data;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOSTunsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
#endifint al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;int type = 0, j;unsigned int len;X509 *peer;const EVP_MD *md = NULL;long hdatalen = 0;void *hdata;EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();if (mctx == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}peer = s->session->peer;pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;goto f_err;}/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites *//** If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without* length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOSTif (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64&& EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {len = 64;} else
#endif{if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {int rv;if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;goto f_err;}rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);if (rv == -1) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;} else if (rv == 0) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;goto f_err;}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUGfprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif} else {/* Use default digest for this key type */int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);if (idx >= 0)md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];if (md == NULL) {al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}}if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;goto f_err;}}j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)|| (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;goto f_err;}if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;goto f_err;}hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);if (hdatalen <= 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}//modify begin 使用gmtls 对从 client hello 消息到 client CertificateVerify 消息（不包括client CertificateVerify消息）所有内容做SM3摘要计算
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2EVP_MD_CTX *mctx1 = NULL;if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2){// from client hello to client CertificateVerify(not include CertificateVerify) make sm3mctx1 = EVP_MD_CTX_new();if (mctx1 == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto f_err;}EVP_MD_CTX_init(mctx1);if (!EVP_DigestInit(mctx1, md)|| EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx1, (unsigned char *)hdata,hdatalen) <= 0|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx1, hdata, &hdatalen) <= 0){SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto f_err;}*(unsigned char *)(hdata + hdatalen) = 0;}if (mctx1 != NULL)EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx1);
#endif
// modify end#ifdef SSL_DEBUGfprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif// modify begin 使用gmtls 从上面得到的SM3摘要结果，还需要使用 SM2_DEFAULT_ID（1234567812345678） 做内部哈希，再签名if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)){SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto f_err;}#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2){// SM2_DEFAULT_ID to assign, when compute CertificateVerify signunsigned char z[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];size_t zlen;char *id = NULL;id = SM2_DEFAULT_ID;zlen = sizeof(z);if (!SM2_compute_id_digest(EVP_sm3(), id, strlen(id), z, &zlen,EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_SM2_LIB);goto f_err;}if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, z, zlen)){SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto f_err;}}
#endifif (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)){SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);goto f_err;}
// modify end#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST{int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);data = gost_data;}}
#endifif (s->version == SSL3_VERSION&& !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,s->session->master_key_length,s->session->master_key)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto f_err;}if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);goto f_err;}ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;if (0) {f_err:ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);ossl_statem_set_error(s);}BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOSTOPENSSL_free(gost_data);
#endifreturn ret;
}MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;X509 *x = NULL;unsigned long l, llen;const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;PACKET spkt;if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto f_err;}if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}certstart = certbytes;x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);if (x == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);goto f_err;}if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto f_err;}if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto f_err;}x = NULL;}if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);goto f_err;}/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;goto f_err;}/* No client certificate so digest cached records */if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {goto f_err;}} else {EVP_PKEY *pkey;i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);if (i <= 0) {al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);goto f_err;}if (i > 1) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;goto f_err;}pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));if (pkey == NULL) {al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);goto f_err;}}X509_free(s->session->peer);s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);s->session->peer_chain = sk;/** Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c*/sk = NULL;ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;goto done;f_err:ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);ossl_statem_set_error(s);done:X509_free(x);sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);return ret;
}int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{CERT_PKEY *cpk;cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);if (cpk == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}return 1;
}int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{unsigned char *senc = NULL;EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;unsigned char *p, *macstart;const unsigned char *const_p;int len, slen_full, slen;SSL_SESSION *sess;unsigned int hlen;SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];int iv_len;/* get session encoding length */slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);/** Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too* long*/if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);if (senc == NULL) {ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;}ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto err;}p = senc;if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))goto err;/** create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up*/const_p = senc;sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);if (sess == NULL)goto err;sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */SSL_SESSION_free(sess);goto err;}p = senc;if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {SSL_SESSION_free(sess);goto err;}SSL_SESSION_free(sess);/*-* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as* follows handshake_header_length +* 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +* sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +* max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +* max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.*/if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))goto err;p = ssl_handshake_start(s);/** Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.*/if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {/* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,hctx, 1);if (ret == 0) {l2n(0, p);          /* timeout */s2n(0, p);          /* length */if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))goto err;OPENSSL_free(senc);EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);return 1;}if (ret < 0)goto err;iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);} else {const EVP_CIPHER *cipher =
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AESEVP_aes_256_cbc();
#elseEVP_sms4_cbc();
#endifiv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)goto err;if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))goto err;if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_sha256), NULL))goto err;memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));}/** Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified* for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for* new sessions will live as long as their sessions.*/l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);/* Skip ticket length for now */p += 2;/* Output key name */macstart = p;memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));p += sizeof(key_name);/* output IV */memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);p += iv_len;/* Encrypt session data */if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))goto err;p += len;if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))goto err;p += len;if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))goto err;if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))goto err;EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);ctx = NULL;hctx = NULL;p += hlen;/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written *//* Total length */len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;s2n(len - 6, p);if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))goto err;OPENSSL_free(senc);return 1;err:OPENSSL_free(senc);EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;
}int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
{unsigned char *p;size_t msglen;/*-* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as* follows handshake_header_length +* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)* + (ocsp response)*/msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen))goto err;p = ssl_handshake_start(s);/* status type */*(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;/* length of OCSP response */l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);/* actual response */memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen))goto err;return 1;err:ossl_statem_set_error(s);return 0;
}#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/** tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.* It sets the next_proto member in s if found*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{PACKET next_proto, padding;size_t next_proto_len;/*-* The payload looks like:*   uint8 proto_len;*   uint8 proto[proto_len];*   uint8 padding_len;*   uint8 padding[padding_len];*/if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);goto err;}if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;goto err;}s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;err:ossl_statem_set_error(s);return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
#endif#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN    3STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,PACKET *cipher_suites,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,int sslv2format, int *al)
{const SSL_CIPHER *c;STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;int n;/* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;return NULL;}if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;return NULL;}sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();if (sk == NULL) {SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;return NULL;}if (sslv2format) {size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;unsigned int leadbyte;unsigned char *raw;/** We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some* preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only* ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to* slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a* problem.*/raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;if (raw == NULL) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto err;}for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)|| (leadbyte == 0&& !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,TLS_CIPHER_LEN))|| (leadbyte != 0&& !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;OPENSSL_free(raw);s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;goto err;}if (leadbyte == 0)s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;}} else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,&s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto err;}while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {/** SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the* first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero* first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.*/if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')continue;/* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&(cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */if (s->renegotiate) {SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;goto err;}s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;continue;}/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&(cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {/** The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher* version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected* downgrade.*/if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);*al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;goto err;}continue;}/* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);if (c != NULL) {if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;goto err;}}}if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);goto err;}*skp = sk;return sk;err:sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);return NULL;
}

重新编译

sudo ./config --prefix=/usr/local/gmssl --openssldir=/usr/local/gmssl
sudo make
sudo make install
配置 /etc/profile
激活 source /etc/profile
验证 gmssl version

成果展示

吉大正元身份认证网关和gmssl客户端之间通信

gmssl 客户端命令
gmssl s_client -gmtls -connect 192.168.80.110:8889 -key /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/sign.key -cert /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/sign.pem -dkey /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/encrypt.key -dcert /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/encrypt.pem -CAfile /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/rootcert.pem -state -verify 3
-gmtls 协议类型
-connect 对接端口其中192.168.80.110:8889 是身份认证网关的地址
-key 签名私钥
-cert 签名证书
-dkey 加密私钥
-dcert 加密证书
-CAfile CA证书路径
-state 状态信息
-verify 开启国密双证书双向认证
1 验证深度，分析源码可知，这个数只是接收并输出，并无关键性影响

chy-cpabe@ubuntu:~$ gmssl s_client -gmtls -connect 192.168.80.110:8889 -key /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/sign.key -cert /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/sign.pem -dkey /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/encrypt.key -dcert /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/encrypt.pem -CAfile /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/rootcert.pem -state -verify 3
verify depth is 3
[GMTLS_DEBUG] set sm2 signing certificate
[GMTLS_DEBUG] set sm2 signing private key
[GMTLS_DEBUG] set sm2 encryption certificate
[GMTLS_DEBUG] set sm2 decryption private key
CONNECTED(00000003)
SSL_connect:before SSL initialization
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write client hello
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write client hello
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read server hello
depth=1 C = CN, O = SDT, CN = SDTCA SM2
verify return:1
depth=0 C = CN, O = SDT, CN = 192.168.80.110
verify return:1
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read server certificate
Z=57A18ADE9AE65C4518E01851C91150B786FEC8CD4FA1C22DCA623E2D1C4B494D
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
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read server key exchange
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read server certificate request
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read server done
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write client certificate
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write client key exchange
ssl_get_algorithm2=b9cdb00008x
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write certificate verify
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write change cipher spec
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write finished
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write finished
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read change cipher spec
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read finished
---
Certificate chain0 s:/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=192.168.80.110i:/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=SDTCA SM21 s:/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=192.168.80.110i:/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=SDTCA SM2
---
Server certificate
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIByzCCAXGgAwIBAgIIMBQFazElStAwCgYIKoEcz1UBg3UwLzELMAkGA1UEBhMC
Q04xDDAKBgNVBAoMA1NEVDESMBAGA1UEAwwJU0RUQ0EgU00yMB4XDTIyMDkwODA4
NTAxOVoXDTI3MDkwNzA4NTAxOVowNDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQ04xDDAKBgNVBAoMA1NE
VDEXMBUGA1UEAwwOMTkyLjE2OC44MC4xMTAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqgRzPVQGC
LQNCAATlDQxehfZeFn05t6UUNR+I0dA2zYjtOeUtHdB/WRCjE6YlMzUYRDmsvHXF
KtXeAioY+DwazbfwkHEBJhyIgzWUo3IwcDALBgNVHQ8EBAMCBsAwIQYDVR0fBBow
GDAWoBSgEoYQaHR0cDovLzEyNy4wLjAuMTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUSd5ccizI5+TH9ODp
Aq6++mew1OAwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUCBfVn6804pFljyvOzfK1quex4rwwCgYIKoEc
z1UBg3UDSAAwRQIhAOdvLFjuQ2ZwbyR26T3PHMyW/Dfli5gpC4TX7xSWFjlbAiBE
6MtGGkPaS1I1lB2Vkiq5ifWNdTCzBzFeV6W6sHeGag==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
subject=/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=192.168.80.110
issuer=/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=SDTCA SM2
---
Acceptable client certificate CA names
/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=SDTCA SM2
Client Certificate Types: RSA sign, ECDSA sign
---
SSL handshake has read 1238 bytes and written 1773 bytes
Verification: OK
---
New, GMTLSv1.1, Cipher is SM2-WITH-SMS4-SM3
Server public key is 256 bit
Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported
Compression: NONE
Expansion: NONE
No ALPN negotiated
SSL-Session:Protocol  : GMTLSv1.1Cipher    : SM2-WITH-SMS4-SM3Session-ID: Session-ID-ctx: Master-Key: 83AEC9F0773CE4364F070F44FCCFFAF4AA6C09090AC71009D67F03313553DABD8E36C4E0AE61CD876B2ED2095EC9A905PSK identity: NonePSK identity hint: NoneSRP username: NoneStart Time: 1668134562Timeout   : 7200 (sec)Verify return code: 0 (ok)Extended master secret: no
---
SSL3 alert read:warning:close notify
closed
SSL3 alert write:warning:close notify